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Abstract 
This paper introduces a model for detecting low-quality information we refer to as the Index of 
Measured-diversity, Partisan-certainty, Ephemerality, and Domain (IMPED). The model 
purports that low-quality information is characterized by ephemerality, as opposed to quality 
content that is designed for permanence. The IMPED model leverages linguistic and temporal 
patterns in the content of social media messages and linked webpages to estimate a parametric 
survival model and the likelihood the content will be removed from the Internet. We review the 
limitations of current approaches for the detection of problematic content, including 
misinformation and false news, which are largely based on fact-checking and machine learning, 
and detail the requirements for a successful implementation of the IMPED model. The paper 
concludes with a review of examples taken from the 2018 election cycle and the performance of 
the model in identifying low-quality information as a proxy for problematic content. 
 




The weaponization of social media platforms for misinformation campaigns pose a fundamental 
challenge to collective discussion based on a consensual and fact-based reality. Successful 
misinformation campaigns take advantage of the biases (Comor, 2001; Innis, 2008) intrinsic to 
social media platforms, particularly the underlying attention economy and its supply chain of 
viral content (Jenkins et al., 2012). These tactics are leveraged to polarize and alienate voters 
from the electoral process (Benkler et al., 2018), a strategy that may take the form of 
misinformation—unintentional behavior that is inadvertently misleading or inaccurate (Karlova 
& Fisher, 2013)—or disinformation, the intentional distribution of fabricated stories to advance 
political goals (Bennett & Livingston, 2018). 
Social media platforms have implemented a range of measures to identify false 
amplification (Weedon et al., 2017) and remove “fake accounts” seeding problematic content 
(Twitter, 2018b), an operational term employed to describe accounts, posts, and links to content 
selected for removal. Similarly, we rely on the purposely broad term “low-quality information” 
as an umbrella concept that refers to misinformation (and subcategories such as disinformation), 
influence operations that mimic the appearance of news outlets, false or fabricated news items, 
and user-generated hyperpartisan news—i.e., polarized narratives reinforcing partisan identity. 
The style, messaging, lifespan, and provenance of low-quality information and hyperpartisan 
content can vary depending on the strategies employed to sow division. It is against this 
challenging backdrop that social platforms have implemented community standards that define 
“problematic content” and the enforcement of such policies (Facebook, 2018a, 2018b; Weedon 
et al., 2017). 
We define low-quality information as textual or audio-visual content with the potential to 
interfere with online deliberation by deceiving, confusing, or misinforming. This working 
definition is agnostic to the veracity or falsehood of statements, drawing instead from the field of 
risk innovation to identify threats to values within social and organizational contexts (Maynard, 
2015). While social platforms define problematic content as information selected for removal, 
our framework deems information to be of low-quality whenever a repertoire of tactics is 
employed to hinder online deliberation, including fast access to information, opportunities for 
self-publishing, and symmetrical conversations among users (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013). 
In summary, low-quality information refers to high-risk, divisive content that blurs the 
lines among misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda, but also user-generated and 
tabloid-like content marked by sensationalized language and speculative reasoning (Bastos, 
2016). This content is often deleted or blocked from social platforms, only to resurface again 
through sockpuppet or surrogate accounts. We seek to contribute to this multidimensional 
problem by proposing the Index of Measured-diversity, Partisan-certainty, Ephemerality, and 
Domain (IMPED), a model that identifies low-quality, partisan information on social media at 
scale and in near real- time. The model employs automated text analysis and web archiving to 




Historically, the challenges posed by modern propaganda were partially addressed with the 
consolidation of highly regulated networks that prevented mechanisms for sharing information. 
Individuals who wanted to share content faced high costs of production and distribution, as with 
print, or contended for access to scarce resources, such as the electromagnetic spectrum required 
for broadcasting television and radio (Bastos et al., 2013). Gatekeeping encapsulated this 
control-communication mechanism based upon sender–receiver roles, and the information that 
passed from sender to receiver had a source–destination direction predefined by the distribution 
system (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008, 2009). 
The concept of gatekeeping as a progressive control system provided the perfect 
metaphor to an information ecosystem supported by mass media. The gatekeeper became a 
powerful image describing a newspaper editor, who determined which inputs were 
“newsworthy” and controlled the flow of reported events. The emergence of digital, 
decentralized networks invited scholars to review the concept of gatekeeping, but it continued to 
refer to a process of selection with control points between the channel and its external 
environment (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009; Welbers & Opgenhaffen, 2018). In other words, it 
remained rooted in a centralized network topology characterized by a bottleneck of 
interconnections determining the flow of information. 
While gatekeeping is historically tied to broadcasting and highly centralized networks 
that prevent mechanisms for sharing information horizontally, social media platforms allow 
peripheral users to seed viral messages. Indeed, the relative centrality of users in the network is 
not a condition for triggering information cascades (González-Bailón et al., 2013). Committed 
minorities can be resilient to influence and may reverse a prevailing majority opinion in the 
population by consistently proselytizing the opposing opinion (Xie et al., 2011). Social media 
platforms compound these effects by utilizing a social infrastructure where users receive 
information from various sources that crowd out the limited content from traditional news outlets 
(Wu et al., 2011). By forging an information infrastructure that bypasses editorial gatekeepers, 
social platforms simultaneously provide exposure to opinions that have been traditionally 
suppressed and allow for large-scale, inexpensive, and horizontal distribution of misinformation. 
The decentralized network topology of social media platforms is not the only cause for 
the prevalent circulation of low-quality information. Low levels of trust in news organizations, 
particularly in the United States and parts of Europe (Newman et al., 2016), along with broader 
societal shifts associated with low-trust societies (Fukuyama, 1995), are largely at odds with the 
consensus enforced by broadcasting networks. Though social media platforms are not sufficient 
cause for democratic destabilization or the fragmentation of public discourse (Benkler et al., 
2018), they have accelerated a process in which traditional institutions are increasingly seen as 
less trustworthy (Zuckerman, 2017). 
 
Fact-checking 
It is against this backdrop of polarization and hyperpartisanship that low-quality information 
flourishes, with politically skewed misinformation resurfacing in the current debate about “fake 
news” (Lazer et al., 2018). Literature dedicated to identifying and removing mis/disinformation 
from social media platforms has relied largely on fact-checking (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Fact-
checking is often posited as the diametrical opposite of misinformation, providing evidence to 
rebut the inaccuracies advanced to mislead individuals (Jiang & Wilson, 2018). While we accept 
that linguistic and rhetorical devices (including emotional and topical markers) may be used to 
detect the incidence of misinformation, we contend that fact-checking inevitably fails to address 
the problem, both operationally and epistemologically.  
Fact-checking fails operationally because: a) it is time-consuming; b) it is available with 
significant delay after misinformation cascades are triggered; and c) it focuses on popular 
content, ignoring a wealth of deleted content that constitutes the long tail of misinformation. This 
approach is particularly unsuitable to the problem given the relative short shelf-life of 
misinformation campaigns on social media platforms, where considerable damage may occur 
before the fact-checking process can even begin. Other serious shortcomings of fact-checking 
and rumor correction are that they are shared at a much slower rate and their penetration is 
considerably lower than the original story (Arif et al., 2017; Starbird et al., 2014). 
A framework relying on fact-checking is also epistemologically objectionable because 
the tacit presupposition is that there cannot be genuine political debate about facts, which are 
assumed to be unambiguous and not subject to interpretation, selection and confirmation bias, or 
ideological coherence (Uscinski & Butler, 2013). Indeed, Marietta and Barker (2019) found that 
fact-checking fails to ameliorate polarization. The partisan divide in trusting fact checks is 
particularly pronounced in those with strong commitments to their values, who are more certain 
than others that their perceptions are correct and rarely read fact-checks. In other words, while 
the literature on detecting false news draws from a framework in which facts are opposed to 
misinformation, we understand that both can coexist and that influence operations often layers 
true information with false (Starbird, 2019), thereby exploiting different interpretations, 
superinterpretations, and oftentimes manipulation of otherwise objective facts. 
 
Ephemeral hyperpartisanship 
In contrast, we have found that low-quality information circulating on social media is marked by 
a short shelf life, which makes it difficult to retrospectively rebuild the public conversation 
(Bastos & Mercea, 2019). This problem is compounded by the extensive use of images on social 
platforms, which are associated with information cascades (Cheng et al., 2014; Dow et al., 2013), 
and the Terms of Service requiring content deleted by a user be removed from social platforms 
(Twitter, 2018a). These policies enable the disappearance of messages and URLs from the public 
view and prevent research on misinformation campaigns. Public web archives, such as the 
Internet Archive, rarely contain records of specific tweets, their attached images, and linked 
content. As a result, it is often impossible to determine what the original social media post and 
associated image conveyed at the time of posting, or how far afield it cascaded. 
User-generated partisan content, often drafted in support of contentious political issues, is 
remarkably ephemeral, disappearing or significantly changing shortly after being posted. 
Previous research on the Brexit referendum campaign has found that a significant share of the 
URLs posted on Twitter disappeared after the ballot (Bastos & Mercea, 2019). The URLs, which 
could not be resolved after the referendum, either linked to a Twitter account that had been 
removed, blocked, or deleted or to a webpage that no longer existed. Nearly one third (29%) of 
the URLs monitored in the study linked to multimedia content, such as Twitter statuses and 
pictures, that was no longer available and whose original posting account had also been deleted. 
We contribute to this literature by proposing a scalable model that identifies low-quality 
information in near real-time. The model leverages the temporal patterns of posting activity and 
embedded webpage content, particularly content modification and deletion, along with rhetorical 
and linguistic devices associated with low-quality information. The model requires real-time data 
collection and archiving and employs methods from information science, social network 
analysis, and text analysis. The model is benchmarked against quality information, thereby 
flagging false news, a subset of content often referred to with the contested and ideologically 
inflected notion of “fake news,” but also misinformation, or content that is inaccurate, but not 
necessarily spread with a political agenda. To a lesser extent, the model may also flag 
disinformation, or the deliberate spread of inaccurate content. Disinformation campaigns may 
however be carefully crafted to meet the requirements of quality content, thereby limiting the 
predictive power of the model. 
 
IMPED: a probabilistic model for detection of low-quality information 
Rationale 
The IMPED model assumes that low-quality information shares a repertoire of features that 
allow for classifying such content at scale. No single similarity measure or training dataset can 
account for the variety of approaches available to misinformation outlets, but we expect 
misinformation campaigns to source content of quantifiably lower quality compared with 
mainstream media articles, which are labor intensive, likely reviewed by an editorial gatekeeper, 
and therefore more expensive. Accordingly, instead of quantifying misinformation with a 
predefined set of metrics, we address this challenge by parametrizing common traits of high-
quality content. We rely on these metrics to reverse engineer misinformation content based on 
stylistic and temporal qualities resulting from reduced gatekeeping structures and practices. 
The IMPED model is distinct from techniques that train machine learning classifiers to 
detect false news based on ground truth “real” news and ground truth “false” news. While the 
latter helps to make distinctions based on stylistic similarities of documents based on terms, term 
combinations, sentence length, punctuations, or parts of speech, the IMPED model is based on 
parametrizing information quality rooted in a range of communication and information theories. 
In other words, our approach deviates from machine learning algorithms based on predictive 
analytics and is etiologically similar to statistical models based on probability distributions. In 
summary, the IMPED model is entrenched in theory, relies on finite samples, is based on 
deduction, and is assessed in terms of confidence intervals (Breiman, 2001). 
We contend that political misinformation has four identifiers. Firstly, ephemerality is a 
trait broadly observed across misinformation sources. While quality content requires extensive 
editorial work at various levels of the news industry and is designed for durability, low-quality 
content is produced in bulk for quick turnover and is characterized by a short shelf life. 
Secondly, political misinformation outlets exploit the pre-existing audience biases through 
partisan content, with a lesser focus on building trust through conventional mechanisms. Thirdly, 
we contend that the fast-paced production of low-quality information presents linguistic 
signatures that sits in opposition to quality content. Fourth, current misinformation tactics are 
designed to hijack information literacy training by impersonating sources and professionally 
designed websites to legitimize low-quality information. While this content is recurrently taken 
down by web hosting services and social platforms, such campaigns explicitly play a numbers 
game by repeatedly reposting the content. In the next section we parameterize this repertoire. 
 
Key metrics 
A key challenge in detecting and studying hyperpartisan news is the relatively high level of 
ephemerality and short shelf life of these articles. With current research focusing on the impact, 
reach, and spread of misinformation (Jiang & Wilson, 2018; Lazer et al., 2018; Vosoughi et al., 
2018), little attention has been given to their remarkably short lifespan. As a result, we lack a 
detailed catalogue of metrics and high-fidelity real-time datasets needed to understand how 
problematic content is operationalized and shared before disappearing from social media 
platforms. Indeed, despite multiple efforts to understand the diffusion of problematic content, 
there is scant literature on how user-generated partisan content is drafted to support political 
issues, subsequently disappearing shortly after being posted. 
The incidence of ephemeral and partisan content is not restricted to contentious issues 
such as the 2016 U.S. presidential election or the 2016 U.K. E.U membership referendum. After 
monitoring national elections in 2018, we found that over 6% of user-generated content 
disappeared after the ballot. Content that tends to disappear from Twitter is largely hosted by 
social media platforms and content curation services. Other than twitter.com, the most common 
domains include bit.ly, youtu.be, goo.gl, instagram.com, facebook.com, breitbart.com, and 
paper.li, with nearly half of the content published using paper.li disappearing shortly after it was 
made public. Paper.li is only one of many services that generate a “professional looking 
newspaper” from user-generated content, another marker of low-quality content as 
misinformation sources often model their website layouts after established news outlets. 
Given the above, we posit that false and hyperpartisan content can be modeled and 
identified based on a catalogue of metrics. We expect content sourced from mainstream media to 
be less likely to include misinformation compared with user-generated content. We also assume 
that low-quality information is considerably cheaper to produce and more likely to be recycled or 
removed altogether from the internet. We therefore expect a key predictor of the model to be the 
time elapsed from the date the article was published to the date the article is significantly 
modified or ultimately removed. The ephemerality score of content can also be aggregated up to 
the domain level, thereby providing another temporal metric for identifying unstable content 
across an entire website. Partisan certainty is naturally an element of hyperpartisan news, and we 
expect it to be another predictor of low-quality information. Lastly, the content of the social 
media post and that of the webpage(s) linked in the post can be analyzed for measurements of 
diversity and rhetorical devices. 
 
The IMPED model 
The metrics catalogued above allow us to parametrize a misinformation threshold as a 
combination of five scores based on linguistic diversity, partisan certainty, user or mainstream-
generated content, ephemerality index, and domain stability. The misinformation threshold 
indicates the optimal point after which we expect the seeding of such content to impede the flow 
of quality information. These metrics are formalized as: a) measured-diversity score; b) partisan-
certainty score; c) source score; d) domain stability score; and e) ephemerality score, that is, the 
difference in the URL content between the time it was referenced in a social media post and the 
time the content was significantly changed or became inaccessible. These metrics are leveraged 
to identify user-generated information that is likely to meet the classification of low-quality 
content. Further versions of the model could also incorporate properties based on user and post 
metadata as well as network metrics associated with the message diffusion. 
We refer to this model as IMPED (Index of Measured-diversity, Partisan-certainty, 
Ephemerality, and Domain), in which the elements of linguistic variance, partisan certainty, 
media source, ephemerality, and domain stability are used to estimate a parametric survival 
model where the likelihood of content disappearing is an approximation to low-quality 
information. The unit of analysis of the IMPED model is the combination of the social media 
post (e.g., tweet or Facebook post) and the content of URLs embedded in the post (if available). 
We refer to this unit of analysis as the u-content. Implementation of the model requires real-time 
archiving of URLs posted on social media platforms at the time of posting and the archiving of 
the social media post for analysis of the u-content. The IMPED model relies on five key scores to 
estimate the likelihood the u-content is problematic, detailed in Table 1 below. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
First, the model relies on the Pielou’s and Shannon diversity indices (s-score) to estimate the 
linguistic diversity of u-content as a function of both vocabulary richness and evenness (Pielou, 
1966; Shannon & Weaver, 1962). Pielou’s species evenness and the Shannon-Wiener diversity 
index are commonly employed in the natural sciences to measure the level of complexity of a 
community structure, particularly diversity and patterns of distribution for species in ecosystems. 
Shannon’s measure of information content also identifies the “surprisal” of rare messages, which 
are expected to be more informative compared with ordinary messages. In other words, the unit 
of information I(ѡ𝑛) associated with outcome ѡ𝑛 with probability P(ѡ𝑛) is formalized as I(ѡ𝑛) 
= −log(P(ѡ𝑛)) =  log(
1
P(ѡ𝑛) 
). In our field of inquiry, Brugnoli et al. (2019) explored the 
association between lexical entrainment, or the convergence of linguistic properties, and group 
polarization. Correspondingly, the s-score is an index that characterizes linguistic diversity in the 
ecosystem of u-content, with the expectation that low-quality information will be less diverse 
compared with quality content which is marked by accuracy, grammar and spelling consistency, 
and a richer vocabulary (Lijffijt et al., 2016). 
Second, we estimate partisan certainty (p-score) based on linguistic signals employed in 
the compositions, such as the absence of subjunctive mood to express uncertainty (Jiang & 
Wilson, 2018), specific rhetorical indicators of certainty (Kuklinski et al., 2000), and affective 
validation (Rucker et al., 2014). We posit that the predominance of nouns and the paucity of 
adjectives foreground less-nuanced content expressing partisan certainty, whereas quality 
information contrasts established facts and conditional possibilities. This metric draws from 
scholarship identifying common expressions in hate speech, false news, and texts associated with 
sex, death, and anxiety, as opposed to words related to work, business, and the economy (Pérez-
Rosas et al., 2017). While partisanship is typically associated with bias or ideological alignment, 
the p-score is indifferent to political leanings and focuses instead on rhetorical features that 
express certainty, speculation, and stylistic qualities of text data, such as the mood of verbs and 
use of conditional phrases or future tense. The p-score calculation sums the ratio of conditional 
words to all tokens with the ratio of nouns to adjectives. Because the use of nouns or adjectives 
is not assumed to be interdependent with subjunctive mood verbs, we sum the ratios to measure 
the overall certainty of texts. 
Third, we classify the u-content as user-generated or produced by mainstream news 
outlets (u-score) based on the comScore classification of media sites under the category 
“information/news” with a minimum percentage reach of .01% (comScore, 2013a, 2013b). The 
u-score is therefore the simplest classifier in the model and is limited to scoring the source as 
mainstream or user-generated, a necessary control mechanism that regulates the results of the e-
score for news outlets publishing dynamic content. As such, the u-score is instrumental in 
normalizing the e-score for news outlets constantly updating their stories, providing live 
coverage to events, or publishing additional information and corrections that would otherwise 
trigger the e-score.  
Fourth, we estimate the ephemerality score of the content (e-score) as a continuum of 
ephemerality level (Walker, 2015) in which a zero score is content that has not been changed 
(i.e., it is stable) since posting, a score of .01–.99 indicates content that has been altered, and 1 
(the maximum e-score possible) indicates the content is no longer accessible. Naturally, the 
extent to which social platforms succeed at identifying and taking down problematic content is a 
potential confounding factor of the e-score, so it is important to calculate the e-score on the u-
content instead of the social media post alone. Fifth, and in close connection to the above, we 
calculate the domain stability score (d-score) based on the average ephemerality score of URLs 
hosted by the domain sourcing the weblink embedded in the u-content. The d-score thus updates 
a stable list of blacklisted and domain profile information and represents the time-weighted, 
aggregate ephemerality score for a given domain name. 
These five scores constitute the value space where the IMPED model is parametrized, 
with the s-score and p-score calculated by processing the combined corpus of social media post 
(e.g., tweet) and webpage content (when available), and the e-score and d-score calculated based 
on whether the post was edited or removed and the aggregate score for the domain sourcing the 
webpage. Figure 1 shows the five scores used to parametrize the IMPED model in relation to u-
content and the misinformation threshold, which is the optimal operating point of this linear 
classifier. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Model Implementation 
General considerations 
Implementation of the IMPED model requires social media posts and webpage(s) linked in the 
post to be archived and parsed in real-time, thus creating baseline copies of content and images 
embedded in the message. In addition to archiving web pages on a rolling basis, it is also 
necessary to perform regular checks on the URLs to ascertain whether the resource is no longer 
accessible (URL decay). Without these steps, it is not possible to calculate the e-score and the d-
score. Once the content has been archived, the Pielou-Shannon diversity index and partisan-
certainty scores (s-score and p-score, respectively) can be calculated on the u-content. The u-
score, based on the URL domain, is the only metric that can be calculated prior to archiving, but 
it may be necessary to resolve shortened URLs to identify user-generated and mainstream media 
sources. 
Our preliminary implementation of the model explored weblinks that circulated on 
Twitter during the U.S. gubernatorial, House of Representatives, and Senate elections; the Irish 
presidential election and abortion referendum; the Italian, Brazilian, Mexican, Egyptian, and 
Russian general elections; and the United Kingdom, German, and Swedish local elections. We 
archived content from Twitter Streaming API and took snapshots of images and URLs embedded 
in the tweet. While the IMPED model can also be implemented with previously collected data, 
the archiving of URLs needs to commence as soon as a social media post is created. This is 
because the ephemerality of social media posts will prevent dynamic forensic analysis on items 
that disappeared or significantly changed, a subset to which no baseline is available, and thus no 
s-score and d-score can be calculated. In summary, while implementation of the IMPED model 
is relatively simple, it requires the real-time capture of social media posts and their embedded 
images and webpages. 
 
Examples 
The five examples detailed in Table 2 were archived in the run-up to the 2018 Elections in the 
U.S. Two of the five original tweets are no longer available (accounts suspended), and all five 
original URLs embedded in the tweets are no longer retrievable. As such, the e-score calculated 
from the u-content for these examples varies from .75 to 1, which is the maximum ephemerality 
score in the model. Sample 01 is sourced from msn.com, which is a relatively authoritative 
source of content, but the remainder of the sampled tweets were sourced from user-generated 
sources, including michaelsnyderforidaho.com, conspiracyoutpost.com, and news-info.net. The 
u-score of these items is necessarily high and offers another indication that the content is likely 
of low quality. 
The aggregate score calculated for these websites shows that content hosted by these 
domains is significantly unstable and likely to be altered or deleted, therefore prompting a high 
d-score. The content of the webpages, as shown in Table 2, is marked by stylistic devices and 
vague statements common to daily communication, in contrast to curated content sourced from 
mainstream news outlets. Similarly, the content featured in the text body of the tweets often 
includes several hashtags, a marker of emphatic partisan loyalty. These textual features and 
rhetorical devices would trigger a high s-score and, similarly, a positive p-score, therefore 
placing the five examples as likely sources of low-quality information, which we posit is a proxy 
to problematic content. 
Consistent with the central assumption driving the IMPED model, the content of these 
posts often remains available on Twitter even after the original seeding account is blocked or the 
webpage sourcing the content is removed. This is because deleted content resurfaces via other 
accounts that repost the original webpage on other similarly hyperpartisan websites. For 
example, the original tweet ID 991023408816250880 in Table 2 featured the headline 
“Outrageously Unreasonable Arizona Teachers Strike Is Illegal.” The tweet is no longer 
available on Twitter, nor is the post from conspiracyoutpost.com identified with the shortened 
URL t.co/jQWtQmYcPW. However, at the time of this April 2018 post, five tweets featured the 
same headline and directing to various hyperpartisan websites, including “Grumpy Opinions” at 
grumpyelder.com and “Moonbattery” at moonbattery.com. As shown in Figure 2, and despite the 
original u-content being no longer available, the original hyperpartisan content continues to live 
on Twitter through a process of continuous reposting, recycling, and resourcing to other sister 
accounts and URL domains. 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
These examples were drawn from a database of 13,770,019 unique webpages tweeted in the 
period leading up to 2018 elections, in which 6.3% (869,053) of the webpages disappeared after 
the election cycle. As detailed above, we expect the deleted webpages to have generated several 
sister URL webpages, thereby placing the ecosystem of low-quality information at several 




The u-score and d-score are simple measures based on lists of domains. The former is based on 
the comScore ranking and the latter on the cumulative e-score of domain names that updates a 
list of blacklisted domains. The remainder components of the model (s-score, p-score, and e-
score), however, require greater justification for those seeking to implement the model. We 
validated these scores using a test dataset of the 2018 elections comprising 37,052 tweets posted 
by 27,213 unique users, a subset of content for which we have a snapshot of the webpages 
embedded to the tweet. The test dataset includes 37,052 unique URLs, along with a high-fidelity 
snapshot of the original content, posted between January-April 2018 across eight national and 
regional elections in Brazil, USA, Ireland, UK, Italy, Russia, Mexico, and Egypt, though the 
majority of the content is associated with the United States elections which account for 94% of 
the collected data in the test dataset. Seven percent of the posted weblinks in this test dataset are 
no longer available, a deletion rate similar to that observed across the complete database and 
therefore suitable for testing the assumptions of the IMPED model. 
We proceed by fitting a series of models in which s-score, p-score, and e-score are 
variables predicting whether the embedded URL will be removed and, ultimately, whether the 
user account posting the content will be blocked, deleted, or suspended from social platforms. 
While the former is a key metric of our model, the latter meets the working definition of 
“problematic content” employed by social media platforms and our working definition of “low-
quality information:” content that blurs the lines among misinformation, disinformation, and 
propaganda and that is likely to be taken down by social platforms and web hosting services. 
 We relied on two datasets to parametrize the s-score. Firstly, we calculate the linguistic 
diversity of web pages embedded to posts by benchmarking the observed Pielou-Shannon 
diversity index against Google’s Trillion Word Corpus (Fletcher, 2012), sampled to the 250K 
most common words in English. Secondly, we relied on a dataset of the 250K most common 
words tweeted by 24.7M Twitter Verified Accounts (Baumgartner, 2019) to benchmark 
individual Twitter accounts in the test dataset. Over 56% of the terms in Google’s Trillion Word 
Corpus also appear in the Twitter Verified Account Corpus, and 70% of the latter appear in the 
former. We further benchmarked the results against a dataset including two weeks of headlines 
and blurbs published by The Guardian and The New York Times (Bastos, 2015) and influential 
Twitter accounts.  
The s-score algorithm first calculates the number of characters per word and the number 
of words employed in a sample of text. Words are not stemmed, but punctuation is removed. The 
algorithm returns the mean and variance results along with the “EvennessJ” and Gini scores 
(Pielou, 1966), with the latter increasing as the number of words in the text corpus rises. As Gini 
is significantly more sensitive to the size of the text corpora compared with EvennessJ (r=.578 
and r=.003, p<.001 and p=.985, respectively), the central metric of the s-score is the evenness of 
words we refer to as EvennessJ, a parameter that is less sensitive to the size of the corpus, but 
which requires a minimum of 100 words to perform the calculations reliably. We parametrized 
the test dataset against the benchmark sets and established a .90 point-threshold for the s-score, 
after which we expect the content to be indicative of low-quality information. 
Validation of the s-score shows that low-J words’ decay curves stay lower longer and that 
high-J words decrease quickly. This is consistent with the fundamentals of the s-score: more 
specialized web domains have more evenness of words. The content is less centralized, as news 
outlets strive to produce diverse content instead of republishing the same story repeatedly. 
Similarly, high-quality content, measured by established sources in our benchmark dataset, often 
focus on a predefined set of issues that define their coverage and topical focus. This is reflected 
in Pielou’s evenness index (J, 
𝐻
𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥
) and the larger number of unique words in the samples. 
Inversely, tweets in our sample dataset, particularly those from accounts that disappeared and 
that sourced hyperpartisan websites, are more centralized: posts tend to repeat the talking points 
of a given partisan alliance that then echoes that same content. The results are therefore 
consistent with our hypothesis, with user-generated websites being more likely to score above 
the .90 threshold established by the EvennessJ of our benchmark datasets. 
We completed the validation of the s-score by performing a user-lookup on Twitter API 
to identify user accounts that have been removed, blocked, or suspended since the tweet was 
posted. We assume this cohort to be probable sources of “problematic content,” as Twitter has 
removed this set of accounts for violations to their Terms of Service. Using the s-score as 
independent variable accounting for tweet deletion, but also controlling for deleted content and 
short tweets where the s-score cannot be reliably calculated, a significant model was observed 
[F(2033)=37048; p<2.2e-16; R2adj=.14]. While only one-seventh of the variance in account 
deletion is explained by the model, it is substantial for an endogenous construct such as the s-
score. These results are more clearly observed when analyzing the s-score of larger population of 
users. Indeed, the highest s-score measured from tweets of a random sample of real-world users 
(N=2000) is .78, which is the lowest s-score for users in the test dataset. The score of .78 is also 
considerably higher than the benchmark established by measuring term diversity in verified 
accounts and the other datasets employed to benchmark the model.  
The s-score performance is considerably improved on u-content that includes webpage 
articles due to the larger text corpora available. In our tests, the misinformation threshold 
remained at .90, with The New York Times and The Guardian blurbs (standfirst) scoring a 
relatively low .83 and .87, respectively. In comparison, a sample of 48 full articles retrieved from 
Breitbart scored on average .95. Even when running the algorithm on the entire Breitbart corpus 
of 48 articles, comprising 3809 words amassed into one single document, Breitbart content 
continues to score above .90 (x=.9027231), which is a substantial departure from content sourced 
from The New York Times and The Guardian. Figure 3a unpacks the parameters of the s-score 
and shows the results for the benchmark datasets and the Twitter account of Donald Trump. It 
also includes the five most prolific accounts in our test dataset. This cohort of accounts scored 
.90 or higher for s-score and only @nuuzfeed has not been blocked by Twitter at the time of this 
writing. 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
Validation of the p-score proved challenging, as the classifier requires larger sets of text to 
perform reliably. The sample dataset includes several partisan tweets that nonetheless scored low 
on the p-score scale. These tweets include almost exclusively hashtags, often many hashtags, 
thereby lacking sentence structure with conditional verbs that could be processed by the POS 
tagger, an indication that the algorithm may have to be tailored to the particularities of social 
platforms. We addressed this problem by testing the p-score against Andrew Thompson’s All the 
News dataset, which contains 143,000 news headlines from 15 U.S. news outlets (Thompson, 
2017) and the “Fake News in the 2016 Election” dataset (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017), which 
includes 150 labeled “fake news” headlines according to the codebook published alongside (data 
access was provided through ICPSR, the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research). The classifier assigns a high p-score to titles containing many nouns but few 
adjectives as well as a great deal of conditional language. 
Consequently, headlines and text corpora with more descriptors and a lower incidence of 
conditional verbs present a lower p-score, which we found to be associated with partisan sources. 
Figure 3b shows the p-score of news headlines taken from the “Fake News in the 2016 Election” 
dataset of 1800 headlines and the 150 headlines included in the ICPSR data. While the ranking 
shown in Figure 3b may not represent a consensus understanding of the relative partisanship of 
each publications, it does show the p-score potential in identifying partisan-driven certainty as a 
communication style, with parameters that are easy to calculate when evaluating the model. This 
approach is in no way the only available method for measuring (un)certainty in language 
(Isenegger et al., 2019; Rubin et al., 2006), but the current implementation shows promise while 
also being relatively straightforward. The datasets the p-score was tested against indicate a 
normalized .40 point-threshold, after which we expect the content to include distinctive markers 
of partisan certainty. The threshold can be observed as a simple cut-off point; no conventional 
news outlets surpassed this mark. Subsequent versions of the model should aim for a more 
nuanced heuristic for rating and weighting partisanship. 
Lastly, we sought to validate the e-score by looking into temporal anomalies in the rate to 
which webpages embedded to tweets became inaccessible and the association between web 
content deletion rate and Twitter account termination or suspension. Unfortunately we do not 
have temporal information about user account suspension, but there are substantial anomalies in 
the deletion of web content and a significant correlation between tweet deletion and URL decay 
was observed [r=.29; n=37050, p<2.2e-16]. Indeed, the universe of 2733 webpages in our test 
dataset that we are no longer available were disproportionately tweeted by accounts that since 
then have been blocked, deleted, or suspended by Twitter. In other words, while this cohort of 
blocked and deleted accounts is relatively small, they posted 42% of the links to webpages and 
websites that are no longer available. 
 
Conclusion 
The assumption underlying the IMPED model is that the editorial and curation processes 
required to produce quality information can be parametrized. The model quantifies the extent to 
which content has been edited, curated, or reviewed for quality, accuracy, and persistence. The 
absence of such indicators is used to benchmark low-quality information as a proxy for 
problematic content. These parameters allow us to apply the model to a set of content that is 
broader and more diverse than news articles, despite the model foregrounding news values and 
linguistic features. The reliance on the news production framework and syntax is deliberate since 
misinformation content is intentionally modeled after established news outlets and the semantics 
of news production, often relying on headlines, captions, and the use of quotes to frame an 
unfolding story. 
This leads to a key shortcoming of the IMPED model: it cannot identify sophisticated 
disinformation campaigns that appear well-reasoned and supported by evidence. One such 
example is Andrew Wakefield’s article linking MMR vaccine and autism, which was published 
in a prestigious academic journal and fashioned in scientific language. Another fundamental 
shortcoming of the IMPED model is that it is more likely to classify alternative sources as low-
quality information compared with mainstream media sources. This is due to the model drawing 
from the assumption that quality information can be undermined by networked communication 
and declining public trust in the press. In other words, the parameters of the model rely on 
linguistic markers and post metadata to identify less-well-edited text, highly partisan discourse, 
and user-generated content that is quickly modified or erased; measures that are likely to identify 
not only misinformation and the broader universe of low-quality information, but also user-
generated posts from marginalized communities, activist groups, and grassroots organizations in 
the counterpublics where younger, less educated, second-language speakers are more likely to 
participate and voice potentially radical political ideas. 
We are nonetheless cognizant of the positive roles that user-generated communication 
networks play in online deliberation (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018). These networks support 
gatewatching (Bruns, 2005) and practices in citizen journalism essential to a diverse media 
ecosystem (Hermida, 2010), with citizens auditing the gatekeeping power of mainstream media 
and holding elite interests to account (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). Much of the information 
generated within the scope of citizen journalism is ephemeral, uses informal language, and 
displays partisan traits that differ from the standards of mainstream news coverage. These 
sources of information may not only deviate from any definition of misinformation; they also 
play a central role in increasing the transparency of the democratic process. Conversely, news 
outlets enforcing selective gatekeeping may inadvertently trigger misinformation, as specific 
perspectives are systematically prevented from reaching larger audiences. 
These shortcomings can only be properly addressed by parametrizing the model with 
real-world data that includes instances of citizen journalism and unintentional behavior that is 
misleading. As the model draws from probability distributions, it should be possible to address 
these shortcomings while also avoiding the limitations of current approaches for the detection of 
problematic content based on fact-checking and predictive analytics. The underlying assumption 
is that high-quality content is tailored to remain available over time as opposed to low-quality 
content, largely optimized for fast turnover. This leads to one of the central parameters of the 
model: the ephemerality score that can help identifying low-quality information circulating on 
social media at scale. The relatively low computational requirements of the proposed heuristic 
and score-based model has the added benefit of allowing low-quality content to be identified as it 
reappears on social media platforms through multiple iterations, even after the original content 
has been blocked or the webpage removed. 
We nonetheless expect challenges to arise when implementing the model at scale. 
Implementations of the model will require the real-time archiving of the posts and URLs posted 
on social media platforms, but the output of the model can only be offered in near real-time. This 
is because the calculations of the ephemerality scores for domain and u-content require 
continuous processing of archived data to identify when posts were modified. These posts need 
to be checked regularly to identify the point in time when the resource was modified or became 
inaccessible (URL decay). More sophisticated implementations may incorporate metadata from 
users and posts and sharing metrics that can be used to prioritize the workflow of the model, but 
a time-lag between social media posting and the IMPED calculation is likely to remain. 
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Table 1: Catalogue of metrics of IMPED model 
1 s-score Shannon diversity index of the linguistic diversity 
2 p-score Lexicon-based classifier of partisan-certainty 
3 u-score User-generated vs. mainstream media classifier 
4 e-score Ephemerality level from stable to modified to inaccessible 




























































Figure 3: Validation of a) s-score and b) p-score  
